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In this paper, we present an OLG simulation model with transmission of individual ability and 
endogenous fertility in order to capture the effects that strengthening income redistribution, 
expansion of child benefit, and expansion of educational support have on economic disparity and 
economic growth.   
Our simulation results show that expansion of educational support will achieve a reduction in 
inequality and maintenance or an increase in economic growth. In addition, the effects of expanded 
educational support are greater with a stronger correlation between parent and child ability. 
      On the other hand, our findings show that policies increasing child benefit or expanded minimum 
income cannot be expected to lead to reduction in inequality or improvement in economic growth.  
Keywords: Overlapping generations (OLG); educational support; individual ability; endogenous fertility 
JEL Classification: C68; D9; E62; H5; J13 
 
 
                                                  
1  This paper is the revised version of one which was presented at the Investigative Meeting of RIETI 
Discussion Paper in April 5, 2010. We are grateful for helpful comments and discussions from 
Masayuki MORIKAWA, Daigo NAKATA, Ayumu TANAKA, and the meeting participants. Finally, the 
opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the 
organizations to which we belong. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
RIETI Discussion Papers Series aims at widely disseminating research results in the form of 
professional papers, thereby stimulating lively discussion. The views expressed in the papers are 
solely those of the author(s), and do not present those of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 




1.  Introduction 
In Japan, recent widening economic disparity is gradually reducing the opportunity 
of disadvantaged households to receive higher education.
2  In general, poor parents tend 
to have relatively more children and provide relatively less education. On the other hand, 
affluent parents tend to have fewer children and provide higher education. If the 
national average educational level decreases, the economy may not be able to maintain 
its growth in the future. This means that inequality, differential fertility, and growth 
have a certain relationship. This paper, therefore, asserts that the government should 
strengthen income distribution between rich and poor households.   
   Recent studies clarify the relationship between inequality, differential fertility, and 
growth, as Galor and Zang (1997) have shown. As the first example, Kremer and Chen 
(2000) examine the relationship between economic inequality and differential fertility 
by using cross-country data analysis. They find that inequality tends to have a positive 
relationship to differential fertility. Second, De La Croix and Doepke (2003) examine 
the relationship between economic inequality, differential fertility, and growth by using 
a growth regression with a differential-fertility variable. They find highly significant 
effects of differential fertility on growth. The same regression also reveals that the direct 
effect of inequality as measured by Gini coefficients is not significant, as long as 
differential fertility is included.   
In addition, De La Croix and Doepke (2003) develop an overlapping generation 
(OLG) model with a channel from inequality to growth, showing that inequality affects 
growth through its effect on endogenous human capital and endogenous fertility. They 
find that economies with less equitable income distribution have higher differential 
fertility, accumulate less human capital, and have a lower rate of economic growth. 
Therefore, their study implicitly suggests the importance of income redistribution 
policies, i.e., wage tax and educational support, etc. 
    However, there also exists a separate, traditional approach to determining the 
quantity of education. Biologists distinguish “endowments” and “investment” by their 
source (genetic versus environmental factors). Becker (1967) captures these ideas. 
Families can bequeath human capital and financial assets. Parents choose the level of 
human capital investment in their children by comparing the return for the two 
investments (human capital versus financial assets). When the child’s ability is higher, 
the return on human capital investment rises.
3 Notice that in this framework without 
borrowing constraints, parental income and wealth play no role in determining child 
                                                  
2  In this paper, “higher education” refers to college/university level. 




education or earnings. Only the child’s ability matters. Extending this assumption, 
recent studies elucidate that the relationship between human capital and individual 
ability is more important. Clearly, the smaller the correlation between parent and child 
ability, the greater the earnings mobility. Han and Mulligan (2001) find that earnings 
mobility can be expected to be greater in economies with less variance in ability. In that 
case, the relationship between income redistribution policies and growth may be 
external while the true relationship may be that between individual ability and growth. 
Regarding this point, Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2004) analyze various educational 
supports such as those that exist in most public colleges and other institutions of higher 
learning by using an OLG model with uncertainty in college completion related to 
differences in ability. They find that these supports tend to improve the efficiency of the 
economy. However, fertility is not endogenous in their model. If fertility were 
endogenous, the result of Hanushek et al. (2004) might be different.   
In addition, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the party of the current 
administration, has strongly proposed several policies in the field of “childrearing and 
education” in order to decrease inequality and increase economic growth. Briefly, they 
consist of 1) payment of a “child allowance” of ¥312,000 per annum for each child 
through completion of junior high school (compulsory education), 2) making public 
high school tuition effectively free of charge in order to create educational opportunity 
for all children, and 3) making university scholarships more inclusive, etc.
4 A simple 
policy traditionally meant to reduce inequality seems to be income redistribution. In this 
situation, we have to analyze the effect of the following policies: 1) strengthening of 
income redistribution, 2) increase in child benefit, and 3) expansion of educational 
support. 
Therefore, we establish an OLG model with transmission of individual ability and 
endogenous fertility in order to capture the effects that strengthening income 
redistribution, increase in child benefit, and expansion of educational support have on 
inequality and economic growth.   
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a simple model for 
grasping an intuitive understanding. In Section 3, we will set the model for our main 
analysis. In Section 4, we describe simulation results, and Section 5 presents some 




                                                  




2.  Simple Analysis 
To keep the model very simple, we suppose that there exist only two generations, 
the parents’ generation (generation 0) and their children’s generation (generation 1), and 
each generation has two abilities, high ability ( H x ) and low ability ( L x ). Denote the 
number of parents with high (low) ability as 
H N 0 (
L N 0 ), and the wage rate per ability of 
the high (low) educated worker as  H w ( L w ). We also assume that parents with high 
ability have children with high (low) ability at the possibility  p ( p  1 ). Similarly, 
parents with low ability have children with low (high) ability at the possibility  p 
( p  1 ). Suppose, moreover, that 1) while children with affluent parents and individual 
high ability can receive high education, other children cannot receive it, 2) the worker’s 
income with ability  j x (j=L,H) is determined as  j ix w   (i=H if worker with high 
education, and i=L if low education), and 3) as an initial condition, the education of all 
parents with high (low) ability is high (low). 
In this case, the rich parents who have children with high ability ( H x )—the number 
of such parents is 
H pN 0 —provide high education to their children, and, when the 
fertility rate is denoted as  ) ( H
HIGH EDU
H x n
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  and  H H x w . Moreover, rich parents who have 
children with low ability ( L x )—the number of such parents is 
H N p 0 ) 1 (  —provide low 
education to their children, and, when the fertility rate is denoted as  ) ( L
LOW EDU
H x n
 , the 
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L Lx w . 
Similarly, poor parents who have children with high (low) ability—the number of 
such parents is 
H N p 0 ) 1 (    (
L pN 0 )—provide low education to their children, and, when 
the fertility rate is denoted as  ) ( H
LOW EDU
L x n
  ( ) ( L
LOW EDU
L x n
 ), the number and the income of 
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Therefore, the average income of the parents’ generation and the children’s 
generation,  0 I
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where  ) 1 ( 1 1
H H N N  , and  ) 3 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1
L L L L N N N N    . The Gini-coefficient for income of 
the parents’ generation and the children’s generation,  0 
 





























































In this situation, to assist poor parents of the first generation, government 
implements policies such as the expansion of educational support for higher education, 
child benefit, and minimum income. Thus, poor parents who have children with high 
ability—the number of such parents is 
L N p 0 ) 1 (  —may be able to provide high 
education to their children, and the wage rate that their high ability children can obtain 
is expected to rise from low to high. Thus, by using the fertility rate ( ) ( H
HIGH EDU
L x n
 ), the 
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  
and  H H x w . As a result, the average income and the Gini-coefficient of the children’s 
generation changes as follows: 
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In this case, the following equations and relationships hold, 
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The above relationships indicate that there exists the possibility that such policies 
(e.g. the expansion of educational support for higher education, child benefit, and 
minimum income, which is proportional to the average income before tax) could both 
improve economic growth and reduce inequality, and that this possibility further 
changes dramatically with changes in the parameter ( p ) of ability transmission. 
However, such policy effects depend on changes in the fertility rate, the choice of 
education, and the transmission of individual ability, etc. Therefore, it is too complex to 
analyze the effects mathematically. To solve such problems, in the next section we 




endogenous fertility to consider the effects. 
 
3.  The Model 
In this section, we construct a model for considering the effect of 1) strengthening 
income redistribution, 2) increase in child benefit, and 3) expansion of educational 
support by using an OLG model with the transmission of individual ability and 
endogenous fertility. The detailed settings are shown in the following.     
 
3.1. Household 
Generation  t lives for two periods: childhood and adulthood. All decisions are 
made in the adult period of life. Each family unit cares about consumption ( t c ), the 
number of children ( 1  t n ), and the education of its children ( i t e , 1  ,  i=L or H). The 
selection of education depends on the ability of the children. If each family selects low 
education ( L t e , 1  ), the wage rate per ability of its children becomes low ( L t w , 1  ). On the 
other hand, if each family selects high education ( H t e , 1  ), the wage rate per ability 
becomes high ( H t w , 1  ) by the probability of the children's ability ( 1  t x ) and becomes low 
( L t w , 1  ) by the probability of failure  ) 1 ( 1   t x . The budget constraint for generation  t 
with ability  t x   is expressed in the following equation: 
t t j t t t t t i t t m n w kx c e n           ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 , , 1 1                                   ( 1 )  
where the index i, j=L or H, and the parameter     is the basic cost of childrearing. The 
parameter     represents the opportunity cost which is the net lost income when parents 
bring up a child, 
A
t t W     the subsidy for childrearing which is proportional to the 
average income after tax (
A
t W ),  t   the wage tax rate,  k  the aggregate productivity, 
and 
B
t t W m m   the guaranteed minimum income which is proportional to the average 
income before tax (
B
t W ). In addition, the utility function is given by: 
) log( ) 1 ( ) log( ) log( 1 , 1 t t i t t c n w U                                          ( 2 )  
where the parameter    refers to the weight of preference between the number of 
children, and the consumption and wage rate ( i t w , 1  ,  i=L or H) correspond 
approximately to the human capital of their children. Thus, the expectation of the utility 
can be described as follows: 
1)  if i=L (education=low): 
 ) ( t U E )) ( log( ) 1 ( )) ( log( ) log( , 1 , 1 1 , 1 L t t L t t L t e c e n w                                (3) 




 ) ( t U E   )) ( log( ) 1 ( )) ( log( ) log( ) 1 ( , 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 H t t H t t L t t e c e n w x             
                             )) ( log( ) 1 ( )) ( log( ) log( , 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 H t t H t t H t t e c e n w x              (4) 
Note that the second bracket term of equation (4) indicates the success of obtaining 
a high wage job by receiving a high education, and the first bracket term represents 
failure to do so. 
 
3.2 .Transmission of Individual Ability 
Referring to the basic model of Hanushek et al. (2004), we provide the 
transmission mechanism of individual ability in the following form: 
) 1 ), 0 , min(max( 3 2 1 1 t t t u x x                                               (5) 
where  ] 1 , 0 [  t x   refers to the parents’ ability of generation  t,  ] 1 , 0 [ 1   t x  the children's 
ability, and  t u   white noise which obeys the standard normal distribution at each period. 
Finally, the parameter  j  (j=1,2,3) is assumed to be constant. In the case of 
) 0 , 1 , 0 ( ) , , ( 3 2 1     , all of the parents’ ability is completely transmitted to their children. In 
the other case of  ) 25 . 0 , 5 . 0 , 02 . 0 ( ) , , ( 3 2 1      , only part of the parents’ ability is 




In our model, although the highly educated workers may be employed as a skilled 
labor force and obtain high wages, the lower educated workers, who are employed as 
unskilled, cannot obtain high wages and instead get jobs with a low-wage rate. 
Therefore, the production function of this model economy is assumed to be simple with 
a CES production function, which depends on the efficiency units of both high-wage 
labor and of low-wage labor. 

    
/ 1
, , ) 1 ( L t H t t L L A Y    ,   t t j t j t dx t x f kx L   
1
0
, ) , (   ( j=H, L)            ( 6 )  
where  H t L ,  refers to the total efficiency unit of high-wage labor of generation  t,  L t L ,  
the total efficiency unit of low-wage labor,  ) , ( t x f H  the distribution of ability with the 
population of high-wage labor at period  t,  ) , ( t x f L  the distribution of ability with the 
population of low-wage labor at period t, and  1 0     is the weight parameter of 
productive difference between  H t L ,   and  L t L , .  
In the case of a competitive labor market, the wages are simply expected to be a 
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3.4.Determination of Education 
We assume that the cost of education ( i t e , 1  ,  i=L or H) is proportional to the 
average income of households as follows: 
1 , 1
~
     t
A
t H H t W e e                                                   ( 8 )  
A
t L L t W e e ~
, 1        (   w h e r e  
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) 
where  t L H t W e e ) ~ ~ ( 1        refers to the educational support from government, 
A
t W   the 
average income after tax at period t, and the parameter  i e ~  ( i=L or H) and   is 
constant.
5 It implies that the cost of education is fixed and does not depend on the 
parents’ wage. Higher education is therefore relatively expensive for poor households. 
In contrast, in the equation (1), the opportunity cost is higher for households who have 
high incomes. Therefore, parents with high education and high incomes substitute child 
quality for child quantity and choose to have fewer children with more education.   
The education of each household can be determined by using the optimal control 
approach. From equations (1) to (3), the lagrangian and the expectation of utility can be 
described as follows:   
1)  if Household decides on low education: 
    Because the children’s wage becomes low ( L t w , 1  ) if households select low 
education ( L t e , 1  ), the lagrangian is defined as follows (j=L or H): 
   t t j t t t t t L t t t t L t
LOW EDU
t m n w kx c e n c n w             

 
 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( log 1 , , 1 1
1
1 , 1     
   
    From  this  lagrangian,  the  following first order conditions are driven: 
       ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( , t j t t t t m w kx c       ,   
   
 
j t t t t L t
t j t t t
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In addition, from equation (3), the expectation of utility is described as the 
following form (j=L or H): 
                                                  
5  We also define the average income before tax (
B
t W ), by setting  0  t    and  0  t m   on the average income after 
tax (
A
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2)  if Household decides on high education: 
In this case, the lagrangian is defined as follows (i, j=L or H): 
        t t j t t t t t H t t t t i t
HIGH EDU
t m n w kx c e n c n w             

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 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( log 1 , , 1 1
1
1 , 1     
    
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       ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( , t j t t t t m w kx c       ,   
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    Therefore, from equation (3), the expectation of utility which depends on the 
children’s ability ( 1  t x ) is described as the following form (j=L or H): 
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        On the decision-making of education, each household also considers the children’s 
ability ( 1  t x ). From equations (9) and (10), the condition in which households select 
high education is the following (j=L or H): 
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We assume that parents can observe their children’s ability. Equation (10) therefore 
means that, if  ) ( 1 1 j x x t t    , parents select high education. On the other hand, low 
education is selected if  ) ( 1 1 j x x t t    . Further, the relationship  0 ) ( , 1     j t t w j x and 
0 ) ( 1     t t x j x
 
hold. The income ( j t tw kx , , j=L or H) of each household is different. It 
indicates that, even if children have the same ability, their education depends on the 
environment of their household.   
  
3.5.Government 
We focus on the effect that the strengthening of income redistribution, the increase 
in child benefit expansion, and the expansion of educational support have on inequality 
and economic growth through the transmission of individual ability. In our model, we 
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Where  ) ( , , H t L t t t L L T   refers to the tax revenue,  t
CON
t cY G  the government 
consumption,  
1   t t
CB
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    1 1  the government subsidy 
to higher education at the period t , 
TOTAL
t N  the total population of generation t , 
HIGH EDU
t N
  the population of generation  t   with higher education, and the parameter of 
government consumption (c ) is constant.   
  
3.6.Macro Dynamics of the Model and Initial conditions 
The aggregate dynamics of our model are determined by equations (1) to (12) and 
the following initial conditions:   
1)  the wage rate  :                                                     
) 1 ( , 0    L w ,    H w , 0                                                (13) 






















           (   j=L or H)                     ( 1 4 )  
These dynamics drive the economics path which depends on government policies. 
However, it is difficult to analyze the paths as functional solutions directly, because the 
transmission of individual ability is complex. Therefore, we use a numerical simulation 
method in Section 4. 
 
4  Simulation Scenarios and Results 
4.1. Simulation Scenarios and Parameter Setting 
In this section, first we present several simulation scenarios in order to achieve our 
aim. The scenarios are classified into two cases and four policies. Case 1 assumes that 
the parameter in equation (5) which expresses the transmission of individual ability is 
) 0 , 1 , 0 ( ) , , ( 3 2 1     . This case is that all of the parents’ ability is completely transmitted to 
their children. Moreover, Case 2 assumes that the parameter is  ) 1 , 4 . 0 , 05 . 0 ( ) , , ( 3 2 1      . 
This case is that only part of the parents’ ability is transmitted to their children. In each 
case, we analyze the effects of the following four policies. 
 
       m 
1)  Policy 1 (Baseline)  0  0.0225  0.2 




3)  Policy 3 (Expansion of child benefit)  0  0.0225+     0.2 
4)  Policy 4 (Expansion of minimum income)  0 0.0225  0.2+ m   
   Note:  ,   and  m   are the parameters of equations (1) and (8).   
 
Next, in order to compare the effect of Policies 2 to 4 with each other, it is 
necessary to maintain the government budget of the equation (12) neutrally. Therefore, 
in Policies 3 and 4, we correspond the government expenditure to GDP, which is driven 
from the calculation that the right hand side of the equation (12) is divided by the left 
hand side of the equation (6), with that of Policy 2, by controlling the parameters 
(   and  m  ) on the above table. Thus, the wage tax rate ( t  ) is also endogenously 
determined, satisfying equation (12). 
    Finally, we set the other parameters of the equations (6), (12) and (16) as follows: 
1)  55 . 0   ,  1   , 2)  02 . 0  c , and 3)  4 . 0   ,  2 . 0  s , 
4
0 10  N .  
 
4.2. Simulation Results 
We now turn to describe the simulation results reported in Figures 1 to 6 and 
Tables 1 and 2. Here we present the scenarios of results of Policies 1 to 4 in Cases 1 and 
2. In each figure, the plot denoted as “+” shows the result of Policy 1 (baseline), the plot 
denoted as “●” the result of Policy 2 (Expansion of educational support), the plot 
denoted as “△” the result of Policy 3 (Expansion of child benefit), and the plot denoted 
as “○” the result of Policy 4 (Expansion of minimum income). 
 
(1) Government expenditure and control parameters 
Table 1 (Table 2) shows the government expenditure to GDP and the control 
parameters in Case 1 (Case 2). In Cases 1 and 2, the government expenditure to GDP of 
Policies 3 and 4 completely corresponds to that of Policy 2. This means that our 
simulation results achieve the neutrality of government budget. Thus, the control 
parameters in Case 1 (Case 2) are    =0.0116 and  m  =0.0109 (   =0.0125 and 
m  =0.0115).  
 
(2) Distribution density   
Figure 1 shows the distribution density of the 10
th generation’s ability in Case 1 
and 2. On the ability range (0.1, 0.2) in Case 1, the distribution density of Policy 2 
(Expansion of educational support) is lower than that of other Policies. However, on the 
ability range (0.3, 0.5) in Case 1, the distribution density of Policy 2 is higher than that 




ability. On the other hand, we cannot clearly see such effect in the distribution density 
of Case 2. But as we explain at the following, this effect can be seen in Figure 2, which 
has more detailed information. 
 
(3) Ratio of low-wage rate population, etc 
Figure 2 shows the ratio of low-wage rate population to the total population with 
the same ability in Cases 1 and 2. In Case 1, there are two line groups. The first line 
group is in the ability range (0, 0.2). This group has no slope and the value of the ratio is 
100%. This means that the ability range (0, 0.2) is dominated by only the workers with a 
low-wage rate. On the other hand, the second line group is in the ability range (0.1, 0.7). 
This group has a downward slope from left to right. This means that number of workers 
with a low-wage rate gradually decreases in the higher ability area. These groups of 
each policy are almost the same, but have a difference in the ability range (0.1, 0.2). In 
this range, the low-wage rate population ratio of Policy 2 (expansion of educational 
support) is the only one under 100%. This represents that Policy 2 shifts the distribution 
density towards higher ability.   
Moreover, even in Case 2, we can see such effect. In this case, the low-wage rate 
population ratio of Policy 2 is lower than that of other policies. It also means that Policy 
2 shifts the distribution density towards higher ability in Case 2. 
    In  addition,  Figure  3  shows the normalized population (1
st period=100). In Cases 1 
and 2, the population of Policies 2 and 3 is higher than that of Policy 1. 
  
(4) GDP per capita and Gini-coefficient for income 
First, Figure 4 shows GDP per capita during periods 1 to 10 in Case 1 and Case 2. 
In Case 1, the GDP per capita of Policy 2 (expansion of educational support) is largest. 
That is why the distribution density of Policy 2 in Case 1 has more workers with high 
ability, as we have already described. However, in Case 2, this effect disappears and the 
GDP per capita of each policy is almost the same. In addition, compared with Policy 1 
(baseline), Policies 2 to 4 do not clearly change GDP per capita. This reason is that the 
distribution density of each policy in Case 2 is almost the same.   
Next, Figure 5 shows the Gini-coefficient for the income of each household after 
policies during periods 1 to 10 in Cases 1 and 2. This figure indicates that the 
Gini-coefficient for income after Policy 2 (expansion of educational support) is smallest 
in Case 1. Moreover, even in Case 2, such effect can be seen as an overall tendency. 
This suggests that Policy 2 has the effect of reducing inequality and maintaining or 





(5) Average utility and Gini-coefficient for the utility 
Figure 6 shows the average utility of each generation in Cases 1 and 2. In Case 1, 
Policy 2 (expansion of educational support), compared with Policy 1 (baseline), 
improves only the average utility. In contrast, Policies 3 and 4 worsen the average 
utility. Moreover, Figure 7 shows the Gini-coefficient for the utility of each generation 
in Cases 1 and 2. In Case 1, Policy 2 (expansion of educational support), compared with 
Policy 1 (baseline), improves only the Gini-coefficient for utility.   
In Case 2, such effects on the average utility and the Gini-coefficient for utility can 
be clearly seen as an overall tendency. These facts suggest that Policy 2 (expansion of 
educational support), compared with Policy 3 (expansion of child benefit) or Policy 4 
(expansion of minimum income), should be carried out in order to reduce inequality and 
increase economic growth under government budget neutrality.   
 
5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we present an OLG simulation model with transmission of individual 
ability and endogenous fertility in order to capture the effects that strengthening income 
redistribution, expansion of child benefit, and expansion of educational support have on 
economic disparity and economic growth.   
Our simulation results show that expansion of educational support will achieve a 
reduction in inequality and maintenance or an increase in economic growth. In addition, 
the effects of expanded educational support are greater with a stronger correlation 
between parent and child ability. 
On the other hand, our findings show that policies increasing child benefit or 
expanded minimum income cannot be expected to lead to reduction in inequality or 
improvement in economic growth. 
The weakness of our study is that our model does not include the following points: 
1) the effect of heterogeneous households with different preferences such as weight of 
preference between the number of children and consumption, 2) the effect of 
endogenous labor supply, 3) the effect of the existence of a social security system (e.g., 
pay-as-you-go type public pension), and 4) the effects that physical capital or the global 
capital market have on economic growth, etc. These points remain subjects for future 
study. 
In addition, the Japanese government is currently trying to reduce inequality and 
increase economic growth by implementing several policies such as expansion of child 




it may be of use in the evaluation of such policies. 
Finally, our analysis provides a new perspective on the relationship between 
economic inequality and economic growth. Existing studies (e.g., De La Croix et al. 
(2003)) have suggested the importance of income redistribution policies. However, the 
results in this paper suggest that among these policies, educational support may be the 
most important.   
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Table 1: Government expenditure and controlling parameters in Case 1 
 
  Policy 1 (Base line)  Policy 2 (Educational Support)  Policy 3 (Child Benefit)  Policy 4 (Minimum Income) 
  0  0.5  0  0 
   0.0225 0.0225 0.0341 0.0225 
m  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2109 
      
Wage Tax Rate ( )  Period  Policy 1 (Base line)  Policy 2 (Educational Support)  Policy 3 (Child Benefit)  Policy 4 (Minimum Income) 
1 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
2 24.0%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
3 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
4 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
5 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
6 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
7 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
8 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
9 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
10 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
      
Government Expenditure to GDP  Period  Policy 1 (Base line)  Policy 2 (Educational Support)  Policy 3 (Child Benefit)  Policy 4 (Minimum Income) 
1 24.1%  25.2%  25.0%  25.3% 
2 24.0%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
3 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
4 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
5 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
6 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
7 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
8 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
9 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
10 24.1%  25.2%  25.2%  25.2% 
 




Table 2: Government expenditure and controlling parameters in Case 2 
 
  Policy 1 (Base line)  Policy 2 (Educational Support)  Policy 3 (Child Benefit)  Policy 4 (Minimum Income) 
   0 0.5 0  0 
   0.0225 0.0225  0.035  0.0225 
m   0.2 0.2 0.2  0.2115 
      
Wage Tax Rate ( )  Period 
Policy 1 (Base line)  Policy 2 (Educational Support)  Policy 3 (Child Benefit)  Policy 4 (Minimum Income) 
1  24.1% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
2  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
3  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
4  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
5  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
6  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
7  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
8  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
9  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
10  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
      
Total Government Expenditure to GDP  Period 
Policy 1 (Base line)  Policy 2 (Educational Support)  Policy 3 (Child Benefit)  Policy 4 (Minimum Income) 
1  24.1% 25.2% 25.1% 25.3% 
2  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
3  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
4  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
5  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
6  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
7  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
8  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
9  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
10  24.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2% 
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Figure 1: Distribution density of 10
th generation’s ability 
 
1)  Case1 











2)  Case 2 
























Figure 2: Ratio of low wage rate population   
 
1)  Case1 





































2)  Case 2 















































Figure 3: The normalized population (1
st period=100) 
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2)  Case 2 
 





















Figure 4: GDP per capita 
 
1)  Case 1 





















2)  Case 2 




















   




Figure 5: Gini-coefficient for income 
 
1)  Case 1 




















2)  Case 2 
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Figure 6: Average utility 
 
1)  Case 1 
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Figure 7: Gini-coefficient for utility 
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